This paper investigates the effects of political commentaries on policy rate decisions and policy expectations in the United States and the euro area. The results suggest that political commentaries do influence policy rate expectations in both regions, even after controlling for macroeconomic releases and immediate interest rate expectations. The findings regarding the policy reaction functions reveal that market expectations are mostly rational. There is no evidence that the Federal Reserve responds to political commentaries that suggest rate hikes or easings. Meanwhile, the European Central Bank seems to have steered its policy in line with political commentaries that suggested further easings during the pre-crisis period, consistent with market expectations.
Introduction
"It really helps an economy to have a strong and independent central bank. What I mean by that is a central bank that can make monetary policy decisions without being influenced by short-term political pressures." Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve Chairman Teacher Town Hall Meeting, August 12, 2012 1 The issue of whether central banks and financial markets respond to political comments on the stance of monetary policy is critical for policymaking as well as for expectations formation. In fact, the effectiveness of policy depends on how well a central bank can guide market expectations (Woodford, 2001) . A politically independent central bank has more credibility, which should increase its ability to guide expectations more effectively. If markets believe that the central bank's policy can be influenced by political populism, then politicians can influence expectations and the central bank's desired policy effect can be thwarted by changes in market expectations driven by political talk.
Although central banks are ostensibly independent, it is reasonable to assume that they may respond to political pressure. This possible susceptibility to political pressure has been a popular topic of investigation for many decades, for both the United States (for example, see Weise, 2012; Hellerstein, 2007; Havrilesky, 1995 Havrilesky, , 1988 Allen, 1986) and the euro area (for example, see Maier, 2002; Maier, Sturm, and de Haan, 2002; Maier and Bezoen, 2004) .
A related and unexplored question is whether financial markets believe that monetary policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank (ECB) are influenced by political pressure. The degree to which markets believe that politicians can sway policy is important. If market participants expect the central bank to adjust monetary policy according to political remarks, we should see a revision to market expectations following political commentaries.
In this paper, we attempt to provide an answer to this question, specifically during the recent crisis period. We investigate the response to political pressure of (i) central banks' policy reaction functions and (ii) market expectations related to future policy rates.
We follow the methodology developed by Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2011) to construct dummy variables that quantify political commentaries, and we develop testable equations for policy reaction functions and market-perceived monetary policy rules that include these political commentaries. We split our sample into two periods, the pre-crisis (January 2, 2002 through July 31, 2007) and the crisis (August 1, 2007 , through December 30, 2011 ) periods, to examine whether political commentaries during the crisis period had a different effect on market expectations and policy reaction functions.
Our findings suggest that political commentaries do influence policy rate expectations, even after controlling for macroeconomic releases and interest rate expectations of upcoming meetings. During the pre-crisis period, market participants expected the ECB to ease policy in response to expansionary political commentaries, which is supported by the policy reaction function in which the ECB seems to significantly respond to such commentaries. During the crisis, there is some weak evidence that financial markets expected the ECB to tighten its stance in response to political commentaries advocating tighter policy. In the United States, market participants are mostly unresponsive to political commentaries that suggest a rate hike or easing, which is consistent with our estimates of the Federal Reserve's reaction function.
Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that market participants interpret neutral commentaries as future tightenings. We discuss the likely reasons for this behavior in our empirical analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the construction of the dummy variables that reflect our interpretation of political commentaries, which is key to our analysis. Section 4 presents the model and our empirical specifications. Section 5 discusses our findings. Section 6 concludes.
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Background and Literature Review
Political pressure on monetary policy has been a topic of discussion for many years, following the seminal work of Havrilesky (1988 Havrilesky ( , 1990 Havrilesky ( , and 1995 . More recent literature has recognized that central banks may implement time-inconsistent policies under political pressure, as politicians have different objectives than central bankers; in particular, they have higher inflation tolerance (for example, see Barro and Gordon, 1983; Kydland and Prescott, 1977) . Along these lines, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2011) find evidence that politicians in Europe prefer lower interest rates relative to the ECB. They focus on understanding the motivations behind political commentaries, identifying the factors behind the ECB and the politicians' differences in preferences. They do not, however, examine the effects of political pressure on the ECB or market expectations, which is the focus of our paper. A large literature has studied the Federal Reserve's experience over time. 2 Weise (2012) finds evidence of time-inconsistent policies and argues that the U.S. great inflation of the 1970s was caused, in part, by political pressure resulting in over-expansionary monetary policy. Examining FOMC minutes and transcripts, he finds the political environment led the Federal Reserve to prematurely abandon anti-inflationary monetary policy in 1970 , 1973 , and 1974 . Froyen, Havrikesky, and Waud (1997 find that, in the United States, there are more calls for an easing of monetary policy than a tightening; however, for their entire 1959-91 sample, the Federal Reserve is more responsive to calls for tightening than easing. 3 Grier (1987) finds evidence of an election-cycle influence on money growth rates-specifically, quarterly money growth increases three years prior to an election and declines a year after the election-suggesting presidential political pressure on the Federal Reserve. Grier's 2 Most of the literature focuses on presidential influence on monetary policy; however, Havrilesky (1995, p. 114) finds some evidence of congressional pressure. 3 During the Martin regime (1959:4-1970:1) , monetary policy was tighter than it would have been in the absence of political pressure. During the Burns regime (1970:2-1979:9) , there were 57 easing signals and 24 tightening signals, but monetary policy did not respond significantly to these signals. During the Volcker regime (1979:10-1982:6) , the Federal Reserve responded more to easing signals than it would have done in the absence of political pressure. During the Greenspan regime, there was no statistically significant response to political signaling. results are supported by Hellerstein (2007) Given recent events, it becomes even more interesting to study the issue of central banks' independence and the market's perception of central banks' independence, which is the focus of our paper.
Measuring Political Commentaries
We closely follow the methodology developed by Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2011) to construct dummy variables that quantify political commentaries. 4 Using the Factiva database, which contains a rich archive of newspaper articles and newswire reports, we mimic the search command described in Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2011) to search for statements that contain a reference to the "Federal Reserve" or "ECB" and the political authorities. 5 Each search result is carefully screened for relevance, and from these results, we categorize political calls for easing or tightening, or neutral comments on policy. For 4 Indeed, for the first half of the sample for the euro area, Michael Ehrmann kindly provided us with the dummy variables they constructed for their analysis. 5 The articles contain politicians' comments on monetary policy or the Federal Reserve, not comments by the Federal Reserve itself. An example of our search command for the United States for the pre-crisis period is "Federal Reserve, or Fed, or Greenspan" and "republican, or representative, or governor, or senator, or congressman, or congresswoman, or congressperson, or lawmaker, or Clinton, or Obama, or Bush, or Treasury, or Council of Economic Advisors." The search returned over 80,000 articles for each region. After being sorted based on relevance, the articles were assigned the code +1 for easing calls, -1 for tightening calls, and 0 for neutral comments. In the case of the ECB, we focused on English language papers (following Ehrmann and Fratzcher, 2011); however, many European papers are translated into English, so we also have search results for papers such as Der Spiegal and Le Monde. If there is more than one comment on any given day, the comments are aggregated as in Havrilesky (1988) (Dornbusch, Favero, and Giavazzi, 1998; De Grauwe, Dewachter, and Giavazzi, 1998; Heinemann and Huefner, 2004; Bouvet and King, 2013) . Each country in the euro area has one vote and decisions are made by simple majority rule. As a result, smaller countries have a larger voice given their size in the monetary union, which can matter if inflation tolerance differs among participating countries (Berger and De Hann, 2002; Meade and Sheets, 2005) . We do not weigh commentary on ECB policy by politicians in the euro area by nationality but rather take the approach that the ECB considers euroarea interests (Gerlach 2007) . concern Chairman Bernanke's nomination and confirmation.
8 Article 10 in the Protocol (No. 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB. 9 We should note that our sample ends before the ECB implemented more radical unconventional monetary policy actions, such as negative interest rates or quantitative easing. Such actions led to a rise in the number of PCs criticizing the ECB, similar to the U.S. experience.
The Model and Data
We assume that central banks-the Federal Reserve and the ECB in our empirical application-set their target policy rates, or more generally their monetary policy stance, following a standard Taylor rule:
where (π-π*) is the deviation of the actual inflation rate (π) from an inflation target (π*)
(that is, the price gap), (y-y*) is the deviation of the actual output growth rate (y) from the growth rate of potential GDP (y*) (that is, a measure of the output gap), and rτ represents the target rate for the central bank at the end of the intermeeting period τ. In a framework similar to Hamilton, Pruitt, and Borger (2011), we consider the expectation of equation (2) conditional on information available to market participants as of day tthat is, Ωt:
Thus, the change in expectation between day t-1 and day t can be written as
Assuming that inflation and output targets do not change on a day-to-day basis, the above
which can be rewritten as
is the daily change in the market expected policy rate over term τ, and ΔS π and ΔS y are the changes in the expected level of inflation and real activity, respectively.
Baseline equations (2) and (6) 
a. Detailed Specification of the Policy Reaction Functions
To check whether political commentaries have any significant effect on the policy reaction function, we derive an empirically testable counterpart of equation (2)-an ordered probit model that incorporates political commentaries into the reaction function.
The discrete nature of monetary policy decisions suggests the use of an ordered response model, similar in methodology to Hausman, Lo, and Mackinlay (1992) . These studies normally analyze policy rate changes that typically occur in discrete increments of 25 basis points. The period that we analyze, however, includes much more than rate changes, as a number of unconventional monetary policy measures started to be implemented as of 2008 in both the United States and the euro area. Therefore, to analyze the policy reaction functions, we use a multivariate probit where the dependent policy variable is a dummy that takes the values y τ = {-1, 0, 1} according to whether the policy is a tightening measure, neutral, or an easing measure, respectively. Because of the mixing of policy rate changes and unconventional monetary policy announcements, we focus on the sign of the policy changes rather than the size. The list of dates and measures for the period of unconventional policies follows Rogers, Scotti, and Wright (2014) . The unconventional monetary policies include large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) announcements, as well as some Jackson Hole and other influential speeches in the United States, and speeches and announcements of new measures in the euro area, such as the introduction of the fixed rate full allotment policy, of the six-month, one-year, and threeyear longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), and of the covered bond purchase program.
We set our time unit to be the time interval between two policy meetings. This interval generally corresponds to the pre-established meeting calendar, but occasionally policy measures are adopted during the intermeeting period between two regular meetings. 10 It is easier to describe the model by indexing observations by event τ, representing policy meeting days, rather than days t, as policy rate changes only occur on particular dates. Consequently, τ =1 corresponds to the first policy meeting, τ =2 to the second, and τ =N to the last. Let rτ denote the τ th policy change and ντ denote a vector of variables, namely inflation and output, observed during the period prior to the τ th policy meeting that may have influenced the central bank's decision as to whether to ease or tighten policy. We hypothesize the existence of an unobserved latent variable,
where
Then, the observed series of policy measures is related to the unobserved latent process as follows: . 11 Therefore, the probability to have an easing measure will be 10 For the euro area, there are no policy changes in the "-1" category. For the United States, there is only one such change, which is the last interest rate cut in December 2008. 11 Policy changes typically occur in discrete increments of 25 basis points in both regions. In particular, during our 2002-11 sample period, most of the policy changes fall into the following categories:
A more traditional probit model, therefore, would define equation (8) as follows:
or, if we denote the standard normal cumulative distribution by ( )
from which the log-likelihood of the model can be trivially expressed and maximized by conventional procedures with respect to the parameters of interest.
We keep the idea of a simple Taylor rule framework in mind when we construct the explanatory variables included in the reaction function. We use the last observed value of the unemployment rate (yτ) and the inflation rate (πτ) as measures of the output gap and the price gap, respectively. 12 We add a volatility measure (volt-1) from the previous day to this baseline model to capture financial stress, especially during the crisis period. In addition, we add our main variable of interest, the political commentaries (PC -, PC 0 , PC + ). To check whether commentaries released closer to a policy meeting have a larger effect on the policy decision, we look at the 3-day and 10-day periods prior to a meeting, as well as the total number of political commentaries that were released over the entire intermeeting period. 13 Our underlying probit regression is of the type Our results for the euro area, for which there is no zero-lower-bound problem, are robust to this specification as well. 12 To the extent that the inflation and output targets are constant over time, we can disregard them, as the probit is identified up to scale. 13 In our empirical specification, we separate the effects of dovish and hawkish commentaries, which allows us to interpret the probabilities in a probit model in a straightforward way. Although there may not be any theoretical reason to make such a distinction, this general form allows us to test and confirm the presence of a symmetric response, if any. To the extent that the policy response is symmetric to positive and negative commentaries, the coefficient estimates associated with different political commentaries will not be significantly different from each other. 
b. Detailed Specification of the Policy Expectations Model
Our next objective is to test whether political commentaries have any significant effect on policy expectations. If market participants think that central banks respond to political pressures, then political commentaries should be significant in affecting market expectations. To test this argument, we consider the following empirical specification at the daily frequency, which is an augmentation of equation (6): In more detail, our dependent variables are OIS rates, a daily measure of market participants' expected policy rate over the relevant term, and government bond yields. If political commentaries cause market participants to revise their expected path of the policy rate, then they should affect OIS rates. 15 One drawback of using OIS as a measure of market expectations is that much of the political commentary in the United States came during the crisis period and after the policy rate hit the ZLB (recall figure 1) . The OIS rates only capture expectations of future policy rates, not expectations about further quantitative easing. To that end, we also use, as left-hand-side variables, changes in 15 OIS are over-the-counter traded derivatives, namely interest rate swaps, in which the parties exchange at maturity the difference in interest between what would accrue over the life of the contract under the fixed-rate assumption and what would accrue from repeatedly rolling over an investment in the overnight market. The OIS rate can be viewed as a measure of the expected monetary policy rate over the relevant maturities (for example, see Taylor and Williams, 2009) , as the floating leg is tied to a published index of a daily overnight rate reference, like the effective federal funds rate and the EONIA (euro overnight index average) rate. In fact, the OIS rate equals the average of the overnight interest rates expected until maturity and as such is indeed a measure of the expected monetary policy rate over the relevant maturities.
government bond yields to better reflect market expectations about quantitative easing policies once short-term rates hit very low levels. 16 In particular, we use OIS rates from one month to two years as well as 2-and 10-year government yields, though we only show a subset of these maturities. Figure 2 shows selected maturities of the U.S. and euro-area OIS rates that we have used in the empirical analysis.
We believe that implications of a political commentary may take a few days to be digested by market participants and incorporated into prices. For that reason, we look at the effect of a political commentary over a four-day interval from the day it was released (from day t to t-3). Unlike in the previous section, where we also investigated the response to aggregated political commentaries over the intermeeting period, we believe that market participants react more quickly to news and commentaries; hence, we limit our analysis to recent political commentaries.
The direction of the market response to political commentaries depends on market participants' perception. For example, if market participants think that central bankers steer policy in the same direction of political commentaries, then commentaries that suggest rate cuts (PC + ) should be associated with reductions in rate expectations (β11, β12 < 0), while commentaries that suggest rate hikes (PC -) should be associated with increases in rate expectations (that is, β 21, β22 > 0). In contrast, if market participants think that political commentaries cause central banks to steer policy in the opposite direction (that is, to have a contrarian response), then commentaries that suggest rate cuts (PC + ) may cause market participants to think that central banks will "toughen up" and increase rates in the future such that β11, β12 > 0, whereas commentaries that suggest rate hikes (PC -) may lead to policy easing (β21, β22 < 0). A priori, we do not expect neutral commentaries to have an effect on market expectations because such commentaries merely confirm the status quo, and hence we would expect β 31 = β32 = 0.
c. Other Variables Included in the Model
Other variables that we include in our empirical application are surprise measures of economic activity, inflation, and policy rates, as well as a measure to capture overall risk and uncertainty, particularly during the crisis. We use a real activity surprise index (Scotti, 2016) as a summary measure of recent economic data surprises about real activity
variables. An increase in the value of the index tends to be associated with better-thanexpected releases of real activity variables and therefore suggests that the economy is doing better than expected, compared with Bloomberg expectations. On a daily basis, the index is a measure of the weighted real-activity surprises that have occurred in the recent past.
To analyze the interaction between inflation expectations and monetary policy expectations, we use inflation surprise indexes for the United States and the euro area similar to the real activity surprise index previously described. These inflation surprise indexes reflect the effects of any relevant data release on inflation expectations on a continuous basis. 17 The main advantages of including these surprise indexes are that they summarize a lot of relevant information about real activity and inflation, and they control for the fact that data releases on other macroeconomic variables and political commentaries may cause revisions to market expectations relative to real activity and inflation. In fact, to the extent that political commentaries affect market expectations of real activity and inflation captured by one of the key variables included in the indexes, their influence is incorporated in our index and hence in our specification. These two surprise indexes not only reflect the sensitivity of market expectations to economic developments, but they also control for the potential endogeneity between market expectations and political commentaries. 18 In the presence of these news release indexes, the coefficients on PCs 17 For the United States, the inflation index includes the surprise components of the CPI, PPI finished goods, hourly compensation, and GDP deflatior releases. For the euro area, the inflation index includes the surprise components of the HICP flast estimate, HICP, PPI, and core CPI releases. 18 To the extent that political commentaries respond to the same news releases that also affect expectations of future policy, there is room for endogeneity. reflect the effect of political commentaries on market expectations after filtering out the effect of any news releases that affect political commentaries.
Policy rate surprises are measured as the difference between the federal funds target rate or the main refinancing operation rate and their respective Bloomberg expectations. 19 In principle, policy expectations could react to any developments affecting monetary policy decision making, including political commentaries. To the extent that markets expect central banks to respond to political commentaries and revise their expectations accordingly, PC dummies may become insignificant on the days of policy meetings. Thus, our results regarding the significance of political commentaries err on the conservative side.
We capture the overall uncertainty due to elevated risk factors for the United States with the VIX, the Chicago Board Options Exchange market volatility index; for the euro area, we use VSTOXX, the implied volatility on the Euro Stoxx 50 index. The implied volatilities are expected to capture the elevated risks during the crisis period due to an increase in overall uncertainty as well as general financial stresses that might have affected policy decisions in addition to poor macroeconomic performance. 20 We lag this variable by one day to avoid potential endogeneity between changes in policy expectations and risk factors.
Results
This section presents the empirical results during the pre-crisis and crisis periods for the United States and the euro area for both specifications described in the previous section. We first empirically measure the response of policymakers to political commentaries, and then we estimate the market response to political commentaries.
Combining these results allows us to investigate the rationality of market expectations.
Specifically, if market participants expect interest rates to respond to political commentaries in a particular way and the policymakers indeed steer the policy in that direction, we interpret it as evidence that expectations are rational. In contrast, if market participants expect interest rates to respond to political commentaries in a certain way but the policy is unresponsive (or responds in the opposite direction), we interpret it as evidence that expectations are irrational. Table 2 shows the results from the probit estimation for the United States. We increase in the unemployment rate significantly decreases the probability of a rate hike during the period prior to the crisis. In contrast, an increase in the inflation rate increases the probability of a rate hike, and it is significant for both periods. Columns IV-XII show the effect of the PC variables for alternative time windows. 21 We observe that political commentaries are generally not significant in affecting the policy decision across alternative specifications, supporting the independence of the Federal Reserve as highlighted by Chairman Bernanke's quote at the beginning of this paper, especially in the crisis period in which there were a good number of political commentaries. The only exception is the negative and significant coefficient associated with PC -before the crisis, suggesting that the Federal Reserve was more likely to ease rates when there were 21 Note that if there are no political commentaries during an n-day interval prior to a policy meeting, the regressions are run without that particular PC variable, which is shown by a blank cell in the table (such as column 4, rows 1-2 or column 7, row 3). political commentaries that suggested further rate hikes. Nevertheless, because of the very few political commentaries over the pre-crisis period, we disregard this result. As indicated earlier, an insignificant response associated with neutral commentaries does not allow us to identify whether the Federal Reserve acts in accordance with these commentaries or ignores them. Although we do not observe a significant response to neutral commentaries for the 3-day and 10-day intervals, there is a positive and significant response for the neutral commentaries aggregated over the intermeeting period during the period before the crisis. This response suggests that neutral commentaries confirming Federal Reserve policies make the Federal Reserve more likely to consider a rate hike, although the evidence is not overwhelming. Table 3 shows the policy reaction function for the euro area. Columns I-III show that while an increase in the unemployment rate decreases the probability of a rate hike before the crisis, the sensitivity of the ECB to this variable declines significantly during the crisis period, as shown in column III. Focusing on our main variables of interest, we observe that political commentaries suggesting further easing decrease the probability of a rate hike during the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, the effect of such commentaries increases if they are released closer to a meeting. For example, if a PC + comes during the 3-day period prior to a meeting (column 4), then its effect is about twice as large as a PC + that comes during the 10-day period (column 7) or at any time during the intermeeting period (column 10). Although there is a significant decline associated with commentaries that suggest tighter policy during the crisis period (PC -), there are very few observations to reach a definite conclusion. For robustness, a similar exercise is conducted with the more traditional ordered probit for the euro area and the results are quantitatively similar (not shown). 22
a. Results from the Policy Reaction Functions
b. Results for the Policy Expectation Models
Equation (12) is estimated separately at daily frequencies for the United States and the euro area, both before the recent financial crisis and for the recent sample that covers the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. We use interactive dummies to capture the periods before and after the crisis to see if the changing nature and intensity of political commentaries during the crisis period had any different effect on market expectations. Table 4 shows the estimation results for 3-, 6-, and 12-month OIS rates, as well as the two-year Treasury rate for the United States. Although we estimated the regressions for the entire range of OIS rates from 1 to 24 months, we only show the results for 3, 6, and 12 months for brevity. Similarly, the results for the 10-year Treasury rate are also omitted for brevity. Results for the missing OIS frequencies and for the 10-year government rates are broadly consistent. Market participants do not immediately expect sizable rate hikes, but they believe that such policies will be necessary with the improved inflation outlook in the future. This interpretation is also consistent with the policy reaction function in table 2, where there was no significant response to neutral commentaries during the crisis period.
Overall, these findings are broadly consistent with the policy reaction function results discussed earlier, supporting the rational expectations hypothesis as well as the independence of the Federal Reserve (table 2) . Market participants actually seem to believe the Federal Reserve to be so independent that they even expect it to toughen up in response to commentaries that suggested further easing.
As for the control variables, market participants' responses to data releases are consistent with our expectations. 23 An increase in Scotti's real activity surprise index, suggesting macroeconomic data releases are stronger than expected, prompts market participants to revise up their expected interest rate path (in anticipation of tighter monetary policy). Similarly, a stronger-than-expected inflation number, as measured by the inflation surprise index, urges market participants to revise up their expectation of future policy rates and inflation for the longer maturities during the period before the crisis. Surprises regarding the current interest rate decision prompt market participants to revise their policy path across the entire spectrum of maturities. The sensitivity to such surprises increases significantly during the crisis period at the short end of the OIS maturities but decreases over the crisis for two-year rates. 24 The declining effect of policy surprises at the longer end of the yield curve is consistent with the "timing hypothesis"
of Kuttner (2001) as also investigated in Demiralp and Jorda (2004) . 25 Short-term policy expectations are also affected from changes in financial stresses and market uncertainty during the crisis period, where an increase in VIX is interpreted as future easing of monetary policy. Table 5 shows the regression results for the euro area, for which we have abundant observations during the pre-crisis period. For the period prior to the crisis, we observe a negative and significant relationship between expansionary political commentaries (PC + ) and market expectations of interest rates for shorter maturities. A similar finding is obtained for the crisis period where commentaries suggesting a tighter policy stance have a positive and significant coefficient across different maturities. However, due to the small sample of contractionary political comments in the euro area (table 1) during the crisis period, this finding should be taken only as indicative. Both results suggest that market participants expect the ECB to respond to political commentaries by steering its policy in the direction of the advice. No significant market response is shown for the vast number of expansionary political commentaries for the crisis sample. When we compare this finding with the ECB policy reaction function, we observe a consistent story: The 24 A more noticable decline is observed for the 10-year rate (not shown). 25 The idea is that central banks typically change the policy rate in discrete increments of 25 basis points in the same direction, and the general trend of these changes is rarely reversed. Consequently, when we calculate the response of different maturities to the surprise component of a policy change, it is possible that the market timed the target change incorrectly but nevertheless anticipated that change sometime in the near future. Thus, the advancement or postponement of anticipated rate changes will have a smaller effect on term rates than actions that indicate a reversal in the policy stance.
ECB indeed seems to react to commentaries that advocate lower future policy rates during the period before the crisis (table 3) .
Looking at the control variables, we observe no significant response to surprises about real activity as captured by Scotti's surprise index. The inflation index becomes significant during the crisis period. Because market participants correctly anticipated all interest rate changes before the crisis period, we do not have an interest rate surprise variable estimated for the pre-crisis sample. Nevertheless, interest rate surprises are significant during the crisis period. Market response to elevated risk and uncertainty, as captured by the coefficient on VSTOXX, is significant for the entire sample. 26
c. Robustness Analysis
As a robustness check, we aggregate positive and negative political commentaries Tables 6 and 7 show the results from these regressions.
Although there is no net effect of political commentaries on market rates for the United States, net hawkishness does yield a significant market response for the entire sample for the euro area. The response is more pronounced for the shorter maturities for the crisis period, but it affects both short-and longer-term expectations for the pre-crisis period.
As another robustness check, table 8 breaks the crisis period into the period before the ZLB that covers August 2007 through November 2008 and the ZLB period that covers December 2008 through December 2011. One can argue that mixing policy decisions while the rates are positive with quantitative easing decisions may be problematic because it assumes they exist on the same space and are comparable. To address this concern, we treat the ZLB period separately, allowing for a different response during this period. We also consider several robustness checks for the estimates of the policy reaction functions. It is plausible to assume that politicians respond to forecasts of economic activity, which help them predict the central bank's actions and comment on these anticipated central bank moves. If this is the case, there is potential endogeneity between political commentaries and policy actions. To control for this forward looking bias, we include changes in five-year swap rates as a proxy for longer-term inflation outlook. The swap rates are not only insignificant in our probit regressions but they do not affect the rest of the coefficient estimates either (not shown).
As another robustness check for the reaction functions, we investigate whether commentaries with opposite content in a given time frame yield a milder response on behalf of central banks. Numerous political commentaries that uniformly suggest a rate hike before a policy meeting may be treated differently, relative to the alternative case of several offsetting commentaries in the same period that suggest a rate hike or a rate cut.
In the second scenario, in fact, the central bank may be less eager to respond to political pressures. While it is interesting to test this hypothesis empirically, the presence of very few such instances challenges reliable estimation.
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether financial markets as well as central banks respond Newey-West heteroskedasticity consistent errors are reported. **/* indicates significance at 95/90 percent level of confidence, respectively. The regressions include a constant term (not shown). Cells highlighted in grey are indicative of significant variables with too few observations to draw a valid conclusion. Newey-West heteroskedasticity consistent errors are reported. **/* indicates significance at 95/90 percent level of confidence, respectively. The regressions include a constant term (not shown). Cells highlighted in grey are indicative of significant variables with too few observations to draw a valid conclusion. 
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